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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Moore’s Law generally asserts that the transistor capacity on a computer 
processing unit increases exponentially over time.1  To exemplify, in 1971, Intel’s 
first microprocessor contained 2,300 transistors and was used in simple electronic 
pocket calculators and by 2007 Intel was manufacturing microprocessors 
                                                          
 Juris Doctor Candidate, Spring 2010, Pepperdine University School of Law; B.B.A., Belmont 
University, 2007.  I would like to thank my family and friends for their support as well as the 2008-10 
staff of The Pepperdine Journal of Business, Entrepreneurship & the Law for their excellent editorial 
work. 
1 60 Years of the Transistor: 1947-2007, http://www.intel.com/technology/timeline.pdf (last visited 
Feb. 20, 2010). 
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containing 820,000,000 transistors used in personal computers capable of near-
instantaneous worldwide communication over the Internet.2  When the framers of 
the Constitution drafted the empowering words, “To promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts,”3 could they foresee such a blistering pace of innovation?  
Have courts been able to maintain the balance between progress and limited 
monopolies?  The history supporting modern principles aimed at spurring useful 
inventions is discussed in Part II of this note.4  Then, in Parts III and IV, the facts 
surrounding a business method patent are described and a decision from the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit confronting fundamental questions 
pertinent to the successful maintenance of the United States patent system is 
explained.5  Next, the impact of that decision is analyzed in Part V.6  Lastly, the 
conclusion is set out in Part VI.7 
II.  BACKGROUND 
Modern patents may generally be thought of as “a grant of monopoly power 
by the state over the commercial exploitation of an invention for a limited period.”8  
However, precursors to patents have been even more broadly defined9 and 
understood to be the sovereign’s rights rather than property rights.10  Drawing 
similar distinctions and tracing the development of patent law has enabled the 
United States Supreme Court to glean the probable intent and understandings of 
bygone legislators when applying existing statutes to new issues.11 
While the notion of a state grant of exclusive rights for inventions in return 
for its release to the public is commonly thought to be rooted in Italy,12 English 
practices are most relevant when discussing the origins of American patent law.13  
Early on, the kings of England issued charters, letters patent, and letters close.14  
These instruments were methods for the crown to conduct various affairs15 and 
                                                          
2 Id. 
3 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
4 See infra Part II. 
5 See infra Part III–IV. 
6 See infra Part V. 
7 See infra Part VI. 
 8 See Edward C. Walterscheid, The Early Evolution of United States Patent Law: Antecedents (Part 
1), 76 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 697, 700 (1994). 
9 Id. 
10 Id. at 715. 
11 See e.g., Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 64–65 (1972). 
12 See e.g., Walterscheid, supra note 8, at 707–15 (discussing a 1474 Venetian enactment as being 
the first known patent statute). 
13 See id. at 698 (“[T]he English common law relating to patents was what was best known in the 
infant United States.”). 
14 Id. at 700–01.  Charters were recorded on Charter Rolls and date from 1199 to 1515.  Id.  Letters 
patent were recorded on Patent Rolls and date from 1202 through the twenty-first century.  Id.  Letters 
Close were recorded on Close Rolls and date from 1205 through the twenty-first century.  Id. 
15 Id. at 701 (“Initially, these documents related primarily to the royal prerogatives, the revenue of 
the realm, and the various branches of foreign affairs as well as grants and confirmations of office and 
privileges, pardons, charters, proclamations, and commissions.”). 
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functioned more broadly than current American patents.16  Akin to modern 
American patents, royal grants and confirmation of privilege by letters patent were 
eventually used by the crown to grant privileges to inventors concerning their 
inventions. 17 
Early on, charters were used to effectively create group monopolies where 
members of a chartered guild had the exclusive right to produce certain goods18 or 
practice a particular craft.19  These group monopolies were municipal or regional20 
and therefore could locally regulate economic metrics such as prices, wages, 
working conditions, and quality of goods.21  However, national development re-
oriented economic perspectives and revealed the local chartered group monopolies 
to be in contradiction to the national economic wellbeing.22  If national regulation 
was the clear answer to maintaining economic wellbeing, letters patent for a 
monopoly were likely a suggested instrumentality for achieving transition to a 
nationalized economy.23  At the least, letters patent came to be implemented in a 
national policy that was in sharp contrast to the antecedent practice of granting 
local monopolies by charter.24 
During the reign of Queen Elizabeth I, patents issued to create a monopoly 
were rationalized by various considerations.25  At least initially, these patents 
granting monopoly were primarily issued to foster economic self-sufficiency in 
England.26  This objective was promoted by issuing patents of monopoly to those 
persons, regardless of nationality, who would introduce a desired trade or industry 
in England.27  While patents of monopoly for inventions might arguably serve the 
purpose of fostering economic self-sufficiency, Jacobus Acontius urged that 
individual interests were of great concern as well.28  Acontius petitioned to have a 
monopoly for his invention because “[n]othing is more honest than that those who, 
by searching, have found out things useful to the public should have some fruits of 
their rights and labors, as meanwhile they abandon all other modes of gain, are at 
                                                          
16 Id. at 700.  Moreover, charters and letters patent performed similar functions as public directives, 
but differed in form.  Id.  Letters close were private instructions to individuals.  Id.   
17 Id. at 701.  Modern patents can be thought of as a particular type of the early letters patent.  See 
F. SCOTT KIEFF ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 2 & n.7 (4th ed. 2008). 
18 Edward C. Walterscheid, The Early Evolution of United States Patent Law: Antecedents (Part 2), 
76 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 849, 851 (1994). 
19 Id. 
20 Id. at 852. 
21 Id. at 851. 
22 Id. at 852. 
23 Id. at 853. 
24 Walterscheid, supra note 18, at 853–54. 
25 See id. at 853–54, 870–71 (“Two reasons were typically given for the monopoly grant: (a) to 
introduce new trade and industry into the realm, and (b) to serve as a means of recompensing the 
patentee for the costs and risks associated with the enterprise.”).  Patents issued during this time were 
unique in that they were largely for grants of monopoly whereas previous patents granted privileges 
only.  Id. at 862–63. 
26 See id. at 855–56. 
27 Id.  Interestingly, desired trades or industries were those that exhibited features common to 
modern patents such as novelty.  Id. 
28 Id. at 854–55. 
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much expense in experiments, and often sustain much loss.”29 
Ultimately, a patent was issued to Acontius30 despite the suspect nature of 
monopoly grants31 because, presumably, it was perceived to benefit England.32  
Patents issued for new inventions and the importation of new industries or trades 
into England were, as a general matter, favorably accepted.33 
Not all Elizabethan patents of monopoly were regarded as beneficial, 
however, and these came to be known as “odious monopolies.”34  For instance, 
although beneficial, serious abuses occurred through patents licensing patentees to 
dispense with statutes forbidding the import, export, and transportation of 
particular commodities.35  A hotly contested class was patents granting the power 
to supervise an existing trade or industry.36  Lastly, in clear contravention of the 
common law and highly despised were patents granted for the exclusive right to 
engage in an existing trade or industry.37  These three general categories of “odious 
monopolies” were suspected of contributing to a prevalent industrial depression,38 
characterized by a “hindrance to trade and manufacture, high prices, inferior 
goods, and unemployment.”39  Moreover, they often delegated the dispensing 
power of the crown—effectively conferring the power of the state onto individual 
patentees.40 
Parliament set out to quell, through legislative enactment, the loathsome 
“odious monopolies” during the November 1601 session,41 but Queen Elizabeth I 
was able to dissuade against possible parliamentary usurpation of her claimed 
power to grant letters patent.42  The solution: have existing patents, but not future 
ones, tried for their validity in common law courts.43  This resolution resulted in at 
                                                          
29 Id. at 854.  Acontius obtained a patent for his invention in 1565.  Id at 855. 
30 Walterscheid, supra note 18, at 855. 
31 Id. at 862–63. 
32 Id. at 852–53, 862–63.  
33 Id. at 864. 
34 Id. at 862–63.  It has been noted that Queen Elizabeth I granted such patents not out of any actual 
financial interest, but rather her frugal tendencies combined with unscrupulous court suitors were at 
fault.  Id. at 864–65. 
35 Id. at 864. 
36 Walterscheid, supra note 18, at 864. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. at 863. 
39 Id. at 865. 
40 Id. at 864.  These state powers included the “right of supervision, search, seizure, and arrest of 
infringers, as well as the recovery of fines or penalties for infringement.”  Id. 
41 Id. at 865–66.  Originally, Parliament introduced a bill named “Act for the Explanation of the 
Common Law in Certain Cases of Letters Patents.”  Id. at 865. 
42 Walterscheid, supra note 18, at 865–67.  Sir Francis Bacon went before Parliament on behalf of 
the queen to inform the legislature that the queen would grant patents for desirable reasons.  See id.  
Parliament did not consider this to be an adequate response to the atrocities created by existing 
monopoly patents.  Id. at 866.  Elizabeth I herself abated Parliament’s anxiety in a message to the 
House of Commons wherein she agreed to have her patents tried for validity in common law courts in 
exchange for the bill before Parliament to be discarded.  Id.   
43 Id. at 866. 
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least two notable cases: Darcy v. Allein44 and The Clothworkers of Ipswich.45  Both 
of these cases noted the general invalidity of a patent granting a monopoly46 except 
where the patent was granted for a limited time and dealt with either establishing a 
new trade within England47 or the discovery of something new and useful.48 
When King James I succeeded Queen Elizabeth I the tension between the 
crown and Parliament regarding the power to regulate letters patent had not been 
remedied.49  Further, James I implemented a policy for granting patents that was 
nearly the same as Elizabeth I’s.50  This relative lack of change may have been the 
problem as public outrage concerning “odious monopolies” continued to mount 
while patent policy hung in stasis.51  In any event, King James I assented when 
Parliament decided to firmly root the law of patents within what became known as 
the 1623 Statute of Monopolies.52  This was the first statutory basis for patent law 
in England and remained the only statutory basis for two hundred years.53  
Moreover, it was during this time that both the United States Constitution was 
ratified with a provision for legislative power over patents54 and the first American 
patent statute was enacted.55   
During the Constitutional Convention, James Madison of Virginia and 
Charles Pinckney of South Carolina discussed the necessity of federal jurisdiction 
over patents and copyrights.56  Following review by the Drafting Committee of the 
Convention, their proposed provisions were merged into one provision reading, 
“To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited 
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings 
and Discoveries.”57  Unanimously adopted without a dissenting voice,58 this 
                                                          
44 Id. at 867 (citing Darcy v. Allein, (1602) 72 Eng. Rep. 1260 (K.B.)). 
45 Id. at 869  (citing The Clothworkers of Ipswich, (1615) 78 Eng. Rep. 147 (K.B.)). 
46 Id. at 868–69 (stating, in The Clothworkers of Ipswich, that there was no power to grant 
monopolies “for that is to take away free trade”). 
47 Id. at 869 (quoting, from Darcy, that monopoly patents were valid “where any man by his own 
charge and industry, or by his own wit or invention doth bring any new trade into the realm,” and 
quoting, from The Clothworkers of Ipswich, that monopoly patents were valid “if a man hath brought in 
. . . a new trade within the kingdom”). 
48 Walterscheid, supra note 18, at 869 (quoting, from Darcy, that monopoly patents were valid for 
“any engine tending to the furtherance of a trade that never was used before,” and quoting, from The 
Clothworkers of Ipswich, that monopoly patents were valid where “a man hath made a new discovery of 
any thing”). 
49 See id. at 871. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. at 873. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. at 874. 
54 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (ratified on June 21, 1788). 
55 Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109 (1790). 
56 S. REP. NO. 82-1979 (1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394, 2396. 
57 Id.  The merging of Madison’s and Pinckney’s proposed provisions is apparent after dissecting 
the final provision into a copyright provision and a patent provision.  Id.  “[T]o promote the progress of 
science by securing for limited times to authors the exclusive right to their writings” evidences the 
copyright provision whereas “to promote the progress of useful arts by securing for limited times to 
inventors the exclusive right to their discoveries” evidences the patent provision.  Id. 
58 Id. 
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provision was engrained in Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the United States 
Constitution.59  Congress’ constitutional power to grant patent rights to inventors 
was thereby established.60  
Although Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 was unanimously adopted, 
substantial doubts concerning the granting of patents persisted for some time.61  
The month following ratification of the Constitution, Thomas Jefferson sent a letter 
from France to James Madison, “urging a Bill of Rights provision restricting 
monopoly, and as against the argument that limited monopoly might serve to incite 
‘ingenuity,’ he argued forcefully that ‘the benefit even of limited monopolies is too 
doubtful to be opposed to that of their general suppression.’”62 
In 1789 and after the Bill of Rights had been drafted, Jefferson again wrote 
to Madison, this time stating he would have liked a provision allowing monopolies 
for a limited term only for literature and inventions.63 
Not only did statesmen privately debate the probable integrity of any system 
for granting patent monopolies, but a more public discourse was under way.64  
During the first session of Congress, South Carolina Representative Aedanus 
Burke presciently noted that drafting a bill upon improvements or inventions in the 
useful arts would be a difficult task that would occasion a substantial measure of 
discussion.65  On January 8, 1790, President George Washington contributed the 
following discourse: 
The advancement of agriculture, commerce, and manufactures, by all proper 
means, will not, I trust, need recommendation.  But I cannot forbear intimating to 
you the expediency of giving effectual encouragement as well to the introduction of 
new and useful inventions from abroad, as to the exertions of skill and genius in 
producing them at home . . .  Nor am I less persuaded that you will agree with me 
in opinion, that there is nothing which can better deserve your patronage than the 
                                                          
59 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
60 Id.  Placement of the Patent and Copyright Clause within Article I, Section 8 specifically 
identifies the provision as one of Congress’ enumerated powers.  Id.; see generally McCulloch v. 
Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 405 (1819): 
This government is acknowledged by all, to be one of enumerated powers.  The 
principle, that it can exercise only the powers granted to it, would seem too 
apparent, to have required to be enforced by all those arguments, which its 
enlightened friends, while it was depending before the people, found it necessary 
to urge; that principle is now universally admitted. 
  A corollary principle is that patents are a right created through a government grant.  ROBERT L. 
HARMON, PATENTS & THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT § 1.2 (8th ed. 2007).  It must be noted that this 
constitutional grant of power is also recognized as a limitation in order to prevent the inequities that 
arose before the 1623 Statute of Monopolies.  Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966). 
61 See Graham, 383 U.S. at 7–11 (1966) (discussing Thomas Jefferson’s critical role in debating the 
propriety of patents and stating that “[t]he difficulty of formulating conditions for patentability was 
heightened by the generality of the constitutional grant”). 
62 Id. at 7–8 (quoting V WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 47 (Ford ed., 1895)). 
63 Id. at 8 (quoting V WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 113 (Ford ed., 1895)). 
64 See generally Proceedings in Congress During the Years 1789 and 1790, Relating to the First 
Patent and Copyright Laws, 22 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 243 (1940) (compiling documents related to the first 
congressional proceedings). 
65 Id. at 259. 
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promotion of science and literature.66 
Washington approved and signed the Patent Act of 1790 three months later on 
April 10, 1790, creating the first American patent legislation.67 
The debate continued.  Expressing a substantial change in thought from 
earlier letters to James Madison, Jefferson wrote to Oliver Evans in 1807 that 
“[c]ertainly an inventor ought to be allowed a right to the benefit of his invention 
for some certain time. . . . Nobody wishes more than I do that ingenuity should 
receive a liberal encouragement.”68  In an 1813 letter to Isaac McPherson, 
Jefferson elaborated on his philosophy of patent monopolies.69  He understood that 
people cannot naturally own a property right of exclusion in the ideas of their 
invention because, once made known to the public, information spreads freely 
from person to person.70  Therefore, Jefferson concluded that patent monopolies 
are only born by society’s recognition that exclusive rights encourage the pursuit 
of useful ideas.71  With one issue rested, another arose: When does the benefit to 
the public justify “the embarrassment of an exclusive patent[?]”72  Offering one 
line of thought, Jefferson argued that patents should only be granted for ideas of 
relatively high utility.73  These letters to Mr. Evans and Mr. McPherson came after 
Jefferson had experience as a member on the patent board and drafter of the 1793 
Patent Act.74 
Despite the ongoing debates concerning patent policy, relatively minor 
changes were made to the Patent Act of 1790 until a substantial revision occurred 
with the Patent Act of 1870.75  And although the current Patent Act of 1952 has 
been considered the second substantial revision,76 the provisions concerning 
patent-eligible subject matter appear to have undergone only minor changes.  The 
Patent Act of 1790 provided that “any person or persons . . . . setting forth that he, 
she or they hath or have invented or discovered any useful art[s], manufacture[s], 
engine[s], machine[s], device[s], or any improvement[s] therein . . . . [may be 
granted a patent].”77  And where “art” has the same meaning as “process,”78 the 
current Patent Act of 1952 provides little variation in its provision that “[w]hoever 
invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or 
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a 
patent therefore, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.”79 
                                                          
66 Id. at 253–54. 
67 Id. at 276. 
68 Graham, 383 U.S. at 8 (quoting V WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 75–76 (Washington ed.)). 
69 Id. at 8–9 & n.2 (quoting VI WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 180–81 (Washington ed.)). 
70 Id. (quoting VI WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 180–81 (Washington ed.)). 
71 Id. (quoting VI WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 180–81 (Washington ed.)). 
72 See id. at 9. 
73 Id. at 9–10 & n.3 (quoting VI WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 180-81 (Washington ed.)). 
74 Graham, 383 U.S. at 9–10 (1966). 
75 S. REP. NO. 82-1979 (1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394, 2397. 
76 Id. 
77 Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109 (1790). 
78 35 U.S.C. § 100 (2000). 
79 Id. § 101. 
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Under the Patent Act of 1952, modern American patent grants are recognized 
as property rights of exclusion.80  Generally, a patent grant affords the patentee 
“the right to exclude others from making, using, selling, or offering to sell the 
patented invention in the United States, or importing the invention.”81 However, 
this right to exclude is for a limited term and generally lasts for seventeen to 
twenty years depending on particular dates of issue and application.82  
Additionally, a patentee may license his or her patent to others.83  If a party takes 
action in contradiction to any right held by a patentee, a constitutional injury has 
occurred,84 and the injured patentee’s remedies may be for damages, costs, 
attorney fees,85 and injunction.86  However, the government has the power of 
eminent domain to deprive a patentee of his or her patent rights.87  These general 
rights and remedies create the opportunity for a patentee to exercise a limited 
monopoly in order to obtain economic advantages.88  The following case 
implicates currently held patent rights as well as potential patent rights as it raises a 
fundamental question not altogether clear from the current Patent Act of 1952 and 
relevant case law: What is capable of being patented? 
III.  FACTS 
Bernard L. Bilski and Rand A. Warsaw (collectively, “Applicants”) filed a 
patent application entitled “Energy Risk Management Method” on April 10, 
1997.89  The application set out eleven claims, the first reading: 
A method for managing the consumption risk costs of a commodity sold by a 
commodity provider at a fixed price comprising the steps of: 
(a) initiating a series of transactions between said commodity provider and 
consumers of said commodity wherein said consumers purchase said 
commodity at a fixed rate based upon historical averages, said fixed rate 
corresponding to a risk position of said consumer; 
(b) identifying market participants for said commodity having a counter-risk 
position to said consumers; and 
                                                          
80 HARMON, supra note 60, §1.1(a) (“It is beyond reasonable debate that patents are property . . .  
.”).  To be sure, the Patent and Copyright Clause affords the grant to inventors of an “exclusive Right to 
their . . . Discoveries[,]” U.S. CONST art. I, § 8, cl. 8, and the right to exclude is the hallmark of 
property.  HARMON, supra note 60, §1.1(a). 
81 HARMON, supra note 60, §1.1(a) (Supp. 2008). 
82 Id. §1.1(a) (8th ed. 2007). 
83 Id. 
84 Id. §1.1(a) (Supp. 2008). 
85 Id. §1.1(a) n.25 (8th ed. 2007). 
86 Id. 
87 HARMON, supra note 60, §1.1(a). 
88 Id. 
89 Ex parte Bilski, No. 2002-2257, 2006 WL 5738364, n.1 (B.P.A.I. Sept. 26, 2006).  The patent 
was filed exactly 207 years after President George Washington signed the 1790 Patent Act.  
Proceedings in Congress During the Years 1789 and 1790, Relating to the First Patent and Copyright 
Laws, 22 J. J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 243, 276 (1940). 
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(c) initiating a series of transactions between said commodity provider and 
said market participants at a second fixed rate such that said series of market 
participant transactions balances the risk position of said series of consumer 
transactions.90 
Generally, this first claim describes a method for hedging risk associated 
with commodities trading.91  Claims two through eleven delimit the broad first 
claim.92  The particular consumption risk sought to be managed is weather-related 
price risk and the commodity involved is energy.93  Moreover, the transactions 
involving commodities are not limited to sales and may also consist of options for 
the right to purchase the commodity at a fixed price during a defined timeframe.94 
The subject matter of the patent can be illustrated by an example of parties 
having different interests in coal.95  Changes in the weather can change how much 
coal a power company will need for producing electricity based upon increases and 
decreases in the amount of power customers need for heating and air conditioning.  
If the demand and price of coal increases due to weather, the power company 
suffers while the coal mining company that supplies the coal benefits, and vice 
versa if the demand and price decrease.96  Patent protection was claimed for the 
method of establishing an intermediary party who sells coal to the power company 
at one fixed price and buys coal from the mining company at a second fixed 
price.97  Adverse, as well as beneficial, weather-related changes in coal prices for 
the power and mining companies are thereby eliminated and uncertainty is 
minimized.98  Moreover, the commodity provider has hedged against uncertainty 
because increases in demand and price mean that it has sold coal at a 
disadvantageous price but has bought coal at an advantageous price, and vice versa 
if demand and price decrease.99 
Each of Bilski and Warsaw’s eleven claims were rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 
101 by the patent examiner because “the invention is not implemented on a 
specific apparatus and merely manipulates [an] abstract idea and solves a purely 
mathematical problem without any limitation to a practical application, therefore, 
the invention is not directed to the technological arts.”100  The Applicants appealed 
and the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (“Board”) found the examiner 
erred insofar as any technological arts or specific apparatus tests were applied.101  
Applying a transformation test did not save the claims either because the Board 
                                                          
90 In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 950 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc) (quoting ‘892 application cl.1), cert. 
granted sub nom. Bilski v. Doll, 129 S. Ct. 2735 (No. 08-964, 2009 Term). 
91 Id. 
92 Ex parte Bilski, 2006 WL 5738364. 
93 Id. 
94 Bilski, 545 F.3d at 950. 
95 See id. at 949–50. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. at 950. 
98 See id. at 949–50. 
99 Id. at 950. 
100 In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 950 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
101 Id. 
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concluded that transforming non-physical financial risks was not a patent-eligible 
process.102  Moreover, the Board found the claims were not patent-eligible because 
they only claimed an abstract idea and did not satisfy the “useful, concrete and 
tangible result” test.103 
Bilski and Warsaw appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit (“Federal Circuit”).104  Their argument that the examiner and the 
Board arrived at erroneous decisions regarding patent-eligibility under § 101 was 
originally presented before a Federal Circuit panel on October 1, 2007.105  Before 
disposition, however, an en banc review was ordered and oral argument was again 
heard on May 8, 2008.106  The Federal Circuit affirmed the conclusion that the 
Applicants’ claims were not patent-eligible.107 
IV.  OPINION ANALYSIS 
A.  Majority Opinion 
Chief Judge Michel wrote for the majority,108 discussing the nettlesome issue 
of what is patent-eligible under § 101109 – a threshold issue that determines when a 
patent may issue regardless of the possibility that all other conditions of 
patentability have been satisfied.110  However, a patent examiner is not required to 
address § 101 patent-eligibility before rejecting an application on other grounds.111  
Because there was no dispute upon the meaning of the claims, the court strictly 
focused on whether the claims were patent-eligible within the meaning of § 101.112 
There was no dispute that the claimed invention sought protection as a 
“process” under § 101.113  The court noted that if it were not for intervening 
Supreme Court decisions, the claims at issue would meet the definition of 
“process” as was originally understood under the 1952 Patent Act.114  Specifically, 
the broad ordinary meaning of “process”—“[a] procedure, . . . [a] series of actions, 
motions, or operations definitely conducing to an end, whether voluntary or 
involuntary”—had been constricted.115 
Various Supreme Court cases were discussed by the court as standing for the 




105 Id. at 949. 
106  In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 949 (Fed. Cir. 2008) 
107 Id. 
108 Id.  The Chief Judge was joined by Circuit Judges Lourie, Schall, Bryson, Gajarsa, Linn, Dyk, 
and Prost.  Id. 
109 See id. at 949–66. 
110 Id. at 950–51. 
111 Id. at n.1. 
112 In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 951 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
113 Id. 
114 See id. at 951–52. 
115 See id. (quoting WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 
1972 (2d ed. 1952)). 
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rule that a patent applicant cannot claim a fundamental principle or mental process 
even if the claim can literally be understood as a process.116  The court specified 
that fundamental processes consist of laws of nature, natural phenomena, and 
abstract ideas.117  Processes that fit these categories are patent-ineligible because 
they are basic foundations of knowledge that must be free to all persons.118  
Logically, determining when an applicant claims a fundamental principle or mental 
process is difficult because inventions must incorporate and rely on these 
foundations of human knowledge.119  The court turned to the Supreme Court cases 
of Gottschalk v. Benson and Diamond v. Diehr for guidance.120 
From Benson, the court considered significant the Supreme Court’s analysis 
that where a patent applicant’s claims cover all uses of an abstract idea, the 
practical effect of granting the patent would be an improper monopoly on the idea 
itself.121  Elaborating on this analysis, the court identified a critical distinction that 
was made in Diehr: Despite the fact that claims may incorporate or rely on a 
fundamental principle, a particular application of the fundamental principle would 
not be improper because such a patent would not operate to preempt all uses of the 
fundamental principle or mental process.122  The court thus concluded that whether 
a patent was improperly drawn to a fundamental principle was a matter of 
determining to what degree a patent applicant’s claims would exclude others from 
a fundamental principle.123  However, the court was not clear in explaining what 
degree of exclusion was improper124 or whether mental processes should be 
examined under the same preemption analysis.125 
Despite any ambiguity in the preemption analysis, the court claimed that the 
Supreme Court had “enunciated a definitive test to determine whether a process 
claim is tailored narrowly enough to encompass only a particular application of a 
fundamental principle rather than to pre-empt the principle itself.”126  The court 
called this test the “machine-or-transformation test” and stated it as follows: “A 
claimed process is surely patent-eligible under § 101 if: (1) it is tied to a particular 
                                                          
116 Id. at 952 (citing Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127 (1948); Gottschalk v. 
Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978); Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 
(1981); Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. 156 (1852)). 
117 Id. at 952 & n.4. 
118 In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 952 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
119 See Diehr, 450 U.S. at n.12 (“[A]ll inventions can be reduced to underlying principles of 
nature.”). 
120 Bilski, 545 F.3d at 952–54. 
121 Id. at 953–54. 
122 Id. at 952–53. 
123 Id. at 953. 
124 See id. at 954 (stating the degree of exclusion to be either preemption of “substantially all uses 
of [a] fundamental principle” or preemption of “all uses of a fundamental principle”). 
125 See id. at 952–54 (stating that “[t]he true issue before us then is whether Applicants are seeking 
to claim a fundamental principle (such as an abstract idea) or a mental process,” but arriving at a 
modified notion that “[t]he question before us then is whether Applicants’ claim recites a fundamental 
principle and, if so, whether it would pre-empt substantially all uses of that fundamental principle if 
allowed”). 
126 In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 954 (Fed. Cir. 2008).  The court noted that this test was “articulated 
in Benson and reaffirmed in Diehr.”  Id. at 955. 
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machine or apparatus, or (2) it transforms a particular article into a different state 
or thing.”127  Under the machine branch of this test, the court rationalized that “[a] 
claimed process involving a fundamental principle that uses a particular machine 
or apparatus would not pre-empt uses of the principle that do not also use the 
specified machine or apparatus in the manner claimed.”128  And under the 
transformation branch of this test, the court reasoned that: 
[A] claimed process that transforms a particular article to a specified different state 
or thing by applying a fundamental principle would not pre-empt the use of the 
principle to transform any other article, to transform the same article but in a 
manner not covered by the claim, or to do anything other than transform the 
specified article.129 
Next, the court addressed the arguments from Applicants and various amici 
concerning whether the machine-or-transformation test was the sole test governing 
analysis of process patents under § 101.130  The court conceded that in Benson—
the first case of the Supreme Court’s trilogy discussing patent eligibility under § 
101—the Court was equivocal in establishing any machine-or-transformation 
test.131  This fact is fairly odd because Benson unequivocally rejected the argument 
that a process patent must be either tied to a machine or transform an article.132  
Further, the court recognized the statement in Flook that “we assume that a valid 
process patent may issue even if it does not meet [the machine-or-transformation 
test].”133  The court apparently thought the assumptive nature of the statement was 
evidence of equivocalness rather than suspicion that such cases would be rare.  
Finally, the Court in Diehr, the last case of the trilogy, stated that “[t]ransformation 
and reduction of an article ‘to a different state or thing’ is the clue to the 
patentability of a process claim that does not include particular machines.”134  
Because this “clue” is similar to the machine-or-transformation test and there was 
no statement in Diehr that it was not the sole test of patent-eligibility for process 
patents under § 101, the court inferred that the machine-or-transformation test was 
rendered the sole test for such determinations.135  In circular fashion, the court 
concluded that their reliance on “the Supreme Court’s machine-or-transformation 
test” was acceptable.136 
                                                          
127 Id. at 954. 
128 Id. 
129 Id. 
130 Id. at 955–56. 
131 Id. at 956. 
132 Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972). 
It is argued that a process patent must either be tied to a particular machine or 
apparatus or must operate to change articles or materials to a ‘different state or 
thing.’ We do not hold that no process patent could ever qualify if it did not meet 
the requirements of our prior precedents. 
Id. 
133 Bilski, 545 F.3d at 956 (alteration in original) (quoting Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 589 
(1978)). 
134 Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 184 (1981) (quoting Benson, 409 U.S. at 70). 
135 Bilski, 545 F.3d at 956. 
136 Id. (“Therefore, we believe our reliance on the Supreme Court’s machine-or-transformation test 
2010 DUCK, DUCK, BILSKI 351 
 
Two requirements of the machine-or-transformation test were then explained 
by the court.137  First, Diehr stated that § 101 “cannot be circumvented by 
attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological 
environment.”138  This holding was interpreted to mandate that no potential 
process patent that merely claims a fundamental principle or mental process may 
become patentable by limiting its application to a particular field-of-use.139  The 
court noted that this is not contrary to the aforementioned preemption analysis 
undergirding the machine-or-transformation test because “pre-emption is merely 
an indication that a claim seeks to cover a fundamental principle itself rather than 
only a specific application of that principle.”140  Moreover, the court stated, “Pre-
emption of all uses of a fundamental principle in all fields and pre-emption of all 
uses of the principle in only one field both indicate that the claim is not limited to a 
particular application of the principle.”141  It was summarily concluded that 
satisfying the machine-or-transformation test necessarily satisfies the requirement 
in Diehr.142 
Second, the court discussed Diehr’s statement that “insignificant post-
solution activity will not transform an unpatentable principle into a patentable 
process.”143  This finding built upon the idea in Flook that “[t]he notion that post-
solution activity . . . can transform an unpatentable principle into a patentable 
process exalts form over substance.”144  The Court in Flook provided an example: 
“A competent draftsman could attach some form of post-solution activity to almost 
any mathematical formula; the Pythagorean theorem would not have been 
patentable, or partially patentable, because a patent application contained a final 
step indicating that the formula, when solved, could be usefully applied to existing 
surveying techniques.”145 
Tension arises when it is remembered that fundamental principles and mental 
processes will exist in all patents to some degree.146  Does this mean that 
significant post-solution activities may transform fundamental principles into a 
patentable process?  If fundamental principles and mental processes are always 
patent-ineligible,147 is the post-solution activity rule superfluous? 
The court also discussed other considerations in an effort to clarify the limits 
of § 101.148  First noted was the Supreme Court’s holding in Diehr that § 101 does 
not require examination of whether an applicant’s claims recite any new or obvious 
                                                          
as the applicable test for § 101 analyses of process claims is sound.”). 
137 Id. at 957. 
138 Diehr, 450 U.S. at 191. 




143 Id. (quoting Diehr, 450 U.S. at 191–92). 
144 Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 590 (1978). 
145 Id. 
146 See supra note 119 and accompanying text. 
147 See supra note 116 and accompanying text. 
148 See Bilski, 545 F.3d at 958. 
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subject matter because these statutory requirements are governed only by 35 
U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103.149  Second, the Court in Diehr explained that “under § 101, 
[an applicant’s] claims must be considered as a whole . . . [and] it is inappropriate 
to dissect the claims.”150  Diehr recognized that “[t]his is particularly true in a 
process claim because a new combination of steps in a process may be patentable 
even though all the constituents of the combination [might be patent-
ineligible].”151 
In section III, the court reviewed its own prior cases and others from its 
predecessor, the United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, which 
followed the Supreme Court’s patent-eligibility cases.152  It was claimed that these 
decisions provided “a wealth of detailed guidance and helpful examples on how to 
determine the patent-eligibility of process claims” because they discussed 
technologies unimaginable at the time the Supreme Court decided its trilogy of 
patent-eligibility cases.153  However, the court began by rejecting two § 101 tests 
promulgated by at least six prior decisions.154 
Three cases from the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals—In re Freeman, 
In re Walter, and In re Abele—developed the now-defunct Freeman-Walter-Abele 
test.155  The court stated the two-step test as follows: “(1) determining whether the 
claim recites an ‘algorithm’ within the meaning of Benson, then (2) determining 
whether that algorithm is ‘applied in any manner to physical elements or process 
steps.’”156  After noting a possible argument that the test may conflict with the 
holistic claim construction rule,157 the court invalidated the test.158 
Another three cases—In re Alappat, State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. 
Signature Financial Group Inc., and AT&T Corp. v. Excel Communications, Inc.—
stood for the “useful, concrete and tangible result” inquiry.159  The court noted that 
this test was related to the machine-or-transformation test, but it “was certainly 
never intended to supplant the Supreme Court’s test.”160  As a result, the test was 
invalidated.161 
                                                          
149 Id. (quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 188–91 (1981)). 
150  Diehr, 450 U.S. at 188. 
151 Id.  Therefore, post-solution activity must be analyzed with regard to all claims made by a patent 
applicant rather than any individual post-solution step.  See supra text accompanying notes 143–46. 
152 Bilski, 545 F.3d at 958. 
153 Id. 
154 Id. at 958–60. 
155 Id. at 958–59 (citing In re Freeman, 573 F.2d 1237 (C.C.P.A. 1978); In re Walter, 618 F.2d 758 
(C.C.P.A. 1980); In re Abele, 684 F.2d 902 (C.C.P.A. 1982)). 
156 Id. at 959 (citing In re Abele, 684 F.2d at 905–07). 
157 See supra notes 150–51 and accompanying text.  The court also cited In re Grams for the 
proposition a claim might be patent-eligible despite the Freeman-Walter-Abele test.  In re Bilski, 545 
F.3d at 959 (citing In re Grams, 888 F.2d 835, 838–39 (Fed. Cir. 1989)).  However, the court later 
acknowledged In re Grams’s reliance on the Freeman-Walter-Abele test.  Id. at n.17. 
158 Bilski, 545 F.3d at 959. 
159 Id. (citing In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994); State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature 
Fin. Group Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998); AT&T Corp. v. Excel Commc’ns, Inc., 172 F.3d 1352 
(Fed. Cir 1999)). 
160 Id. 
161 Id. at 959–60. 
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Without citing any specific decisions, the court then addressed a call from 
some amici curiae to adopt a technological arts test.162  Such a test would require 
claims drafted to some sort of technological art.163  The court stated that a 
technological arts test would be inherently vague because “the terms ‘technological 
arts’ and ‘technology’ are both ambiguous and ever-changing.”164  Ultimately, this 
type of test was not adopted by the court because a technological arts test had 
never before been explicitly adopted by the court, its predecessor, or the Supreme 
Court.165 
Supporting one aspect of State Street, the court reaffirmed its decision not to 
create any categorical exclusion beyond fundamental principles.166  Under State 
Street, the court rejected the categorical exclusion of business methods from § 101 
eligibility because business methods are “subject to the same legal requirements 
for patentability as applied to any other process or method.”167  Moreover, the 
court declined to create a categorical exclusion regarding computer software.168 
After sorting out the above issues, the court reexamined the facts of prior 
cases in order to elaborate on the machine-or-transformation test.169  However, the 
court first restricted its discussion with an eye toward the facts presently before 
it.170  This approach focused solely on the transformation branch of the machine-
or-transformation test because the Applicants had admitted their first claim did not 
tie any step of their process to a machine or apparatus.171  Therefore, the question 
of § 101 patent eligibility was first narrowed to whether the central purpose of the 
claimed process was to transform an article into a different state or thing.172 
Looking to Benson, the court honed in on the Supreme Court’s statement that 
“chemical process[es] or the physical acts which transform . . . raw material are . . . 
sufficiently definite to confine the patent monopoly within rather definite 
bounds.”173  This proposition first meant that the transformation of an article must 
give the patentee’s monopoly “meaningful limits.”174  Next, it classified physical 
objects or substances as “articles,” which may be the focus of a patent eligible 
                                                          
162 Id. at 960. 
163 Id. at n.21. 
164 In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 960 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
165 Id. 
166 Id. 
167 State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1375–76 (Fed. Cir. 
1998), abrogated in part by Bilski, 545 F.3d 943. 
168 Bilski, 545 F.3d at 960, n.23.  The court noted that it would not be helpful to discuss computer 
software patent-eligibility because the facts before the court involved no computer software.  Id. 
169 Id. at 961. 
170 Id. at 962. 
171 Id.  This is a somewhat odd analysis because the court had recognized the impropriety of 
dissecting an applicant’s claims when applying a § 101 analysis.  See supra notes 150–51 and 
accompanying text.  However, the court already noted this was not a case of claim construction, 
and the patent examiner found that none of the Applicants’ claims were tied to an apparatus. See 
supra notes 100, 112 and accompanying text. 
172 Bilski, 545 F.3d at 962. 
173 Id. (citing Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 70 (1972)). 
174 Id at 961. 
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physical or chemical transformation.175  The critical issue of the transformation test 
thus became “what sorts of things constitute ‘articles’ such that their 
transformation is sufficient to impart patent-eligibility under § 101.”176 
Arriving at an issue sure to become paramount, the Federal Circuit 
confronted whether “articles” could be electronic signals, electronic data, legal 
obligations, organizational relationships, or business risks.177  The court found that 
a broadly stated process of visually displaying data would be patent-ineligible, but 
a process transforming data about a specific physical object or substance into a 
visual display could be patent-eligible.178  Moreover, the underlying physical 
object or substance need not be transformed “[s]o long as the claimed process is 
limited to a practical application of a fundamental principle to transform specific 
data, and . . . there is no danger that the scope of the claim would wholly pre-empt 
all uses of the principle.”179  However, the court found that mere data gathering 
usually will not transform any article and the mere addition of a data gathering step 
cannot transform an algorithm into a patent-eligible process.180  The court was less 
than clear when it stated that “the inherent step of gathering data can also fairly be 
characterized as insignificant extra-solution activity” because it is incongruous to 
identify an inherent step of a process as an activity that is insignificant or extra-
solution.181 
In section IV, the majority applied the machine or transformation test to the 
facts of the case.182  Expounding further on the metes and bounds of patent-eligible 
process claims, the court held that transformations of “public or private legal 
obligations or relationships, business risks, or other such abstractions” cannot 
satisfy the machine-or-transformation test because “they are not physical objects or 
substances, and they are not representative of physical objects or substances.”183  
The court explained that Bilski and Warsaw’s process of trading commodities was 
merely an exchange of legal rights that could only amount to abstract mental and 
mathematical processes.184  And even if the trading was limited to the specific 
process of hedging consumable commodities, the effective pre-emption of such a 
fundamental concept would at least require the impermissible pre-emption of an 
entire field-of-use.185  Therefore, the process was not statutory subject matter 
because it failed to meet the machine-or-transformation test and the BPAI was 
accordingly affirmed.186 
                                                          
175 Id. at 962. 
176 Id. 
177 Id. at 962. 
178 In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 962–63 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 




183 Id. at 963–64. 
184  In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 964–65 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
185 Id. at 966. 
186 Id. at 964–66.   
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B.  Mayer Dissent 
Judge Mayer dissented from the majority’s failure to overrule State Street 
Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc. and AT&T Corp. v. Excel 
Communications, Inc. on the ground that business methods should be categorically 
excluded from the scope of patent-eligible subject matter.187  First, Judge Mayer 
argued that history likely lent no support to the constitutionality of business 
method patents because the Framers were familiar with the English Statute of 
Monopolies that restricted the Crown’s ability to grant “monopolies to court 
favorites in goods or businesses which had long before been enjoyed by the 
public,”188 and therefore “consciously acted to bar Congress from granting letters 
patent in particular types of business.”189  Key to Judge Mayer’s constitutional 
argument is that the term “useful arts” in Article I, Section 8 equates to the modern 
term “technology” and that Congress does not have the power to allow patents for 
business methods because these methods “are not directed to any technological or 
scientific innovation.”190  Moreover, Judge Mayer argued that when the current 
1952 Patent Act was enacted Congress intended to promote the case law that stood 
for the proposition that business methods are ineligible for patent protection.191  
After reviewing the possible evils of business method patents,192 Judge Mayer 
concluded that the majority’s machine-or-transformation test was an insufficient 
method for determining patent-eligibility and asserted a technological arts test 
asking whether claims are drawn to the natural sciences.193 
C.  Rader Dissent 
Judge Rader dissented because the majority “link[ed] patent eligibility to the 
age of iron and steel at a time of subatomic particles and terabytes.194  Specifically, 
Judge Rader’s opinion regarded the machine-or-transformation test as an 
amalgamation of Supreme Court dicta195 that raised more problems than it 
solved196 and hindered innovation in increasingly ethereal technologies.197  For 
these reasons, Judge Rader concluded that the Patent Act sets a broad standard for 
statutory subject matter under § 101198 and the present claims were patent-
ineligible because they sought to monopolize an abstract idea.199 
                                                          
187 Id. at 998 (Mayer, J., dissenting). 
188 Id. (emphasis added) (citing Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5 (1966)). 
189 Id. (emphasis added) (citing In re Comiskey, 499 F.3d 1365, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2007)). 
190 In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 1001 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
191 Id. at 999–1000. 
192 Id. at 1004–08 (Mayer, J., dissenting). 
193 Id. at 1008–11. 
194 Id. at 1011 (Rader, J., dissenting). 
195 Id. 
196 In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 1015 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (Rader, J., dissenting). 
197 Id. 
198 Id. at 1012. 
199 Id. at 1011. 
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D.  Newman Dissent 
Judge Newman decried the majority for contravening the Patent Act,200 
contravening precedent,201 and contravening the Constitution.202  Further, Judge 
Newman reasoned that neither the early English Statute of Monopolies203 nor the 
English common law204 limited the § 101 term “process” in the manner the 
majority reasoned.205  After recognizing that the Patent Act contains other 
provisions regarding novelty, obviousness, and specification that could more 
properly preclude or permit a patent for Bilski’s claimed invention, Judge Newman 
concluded that the majority had improperly created an unpredictable standard that 
cast present and future patent rights into doubt and undermined the policy of 
spurring innovation.206 
E.  Dyk & Linn Concurrence 
The concurring opinion joined fully with the majority opinion and wrote 
separately to rebut the assertion in the dissents from Judges Rader and Newman 
that the majority had “usurp[ed] the legislative role” by straying from the scope of 
patent-eligibility under § 101.207  Analyzing the legislative history of the current 
patent act, the concurring judges ascribed various principles from the English 
Statute of Monopolies and English case law to the first couple American Patent 
Acts.208  The concurring opinion concluded that early American patent law did not 
support claims for “organizing human activity” such as Bilski and Warsaw’s 
claims and that there has been no intervening change that would render these 
claims patent-eligible.209 
V.  IMPACT 
A.  Direct Impact 
1.  Post-Bilski Federal Circuit Decisions 
By January 1, 2010, four Federal Circuit decisions relying on Bilski had 
issued.  In Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen Idec, the court exemplified 
three patent-ineligible biotechnology claims, one covering natural phenomena and 
the other two covering insignificant post-solution activity.210  Next, the Federal 
                                                          
200 Id. at 976 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
201 Id. 
202 In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 976 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (Newman, J., dissenting). 
203 Id. at 985. 
204 Id. 
205 Id. 
206 Id. at 995–98 (citing 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–103, 112). 
207 Id. at 966 (Dyk & Linn, JJ., concurring). 
208 In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 966–72 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (Dyk & Linn, JJ., concurring). 
209 Id. at 972–76. 
210 Nos. 2006-1634, 2006-1649, 2008 WL 5273107 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 19, 2008). 
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Circuit differentiated between business method claims that are patent-ineligible for 
reciting mere mental processes and business method claims involving computers 
that come closer to passing the machine prong of the machine-or-transformation 
test in In re Comiskey.211  Defining abstract ideas under § 101, the court, in In re 
Ferguson, found claims related to a marketing business method to be patent-
ineligible.212  Lastly, the Federal Circuit found biotechnology-related claims 
patent-eligible for their transformative nature despite close ties to patent-ineligible 
mental processes in Prometheus Laboratories, Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative 
Services.213 
The non-precedential Federal Circuit opinion Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. 
v. Biogen Idec summarily affirmed the invalidation of multiple biotechnology 
patents because they neither tied a process to a machine nor transformed a specific 
article into a different state or thing.214  The lower court described three of 
Classen’s patents at issue as “methods for evaluating and improving the safety of 
immunization schedules.”215  Each of the patents was held by the lower court to 
claim patent-ineligible subject matter for claiming a natural phenomenon described 
as “an inquiry of the extent of the proposed correlation between vaccines and 
chronic disorders.”216  Moreover, two of the patents included a step of immunizing 
patients pursuant to a low-risk schedule, which was held to be insignificant post-
solution activity.217 
Vacating its previous 2007 decision decided upon obviousness principles 
under 35 U.S.C. § 103218 and issuing, over dissent, a revised version decided upon 
wholly new § 101 grounds,219 the Federal Circuit in In re Comiskey held multiple 
claims patent-ineligible and remanded other claims to the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office (“PTO”).220  The first group of claims discussed by the court 
described a method for resolving unilateral and contractual document disputes 
through mandatory arbitration.221  These claims were found patent-ineligible 
because they were drawn to mental processes and sought to monopolize human 
intelligence itself.222  However, the second group of claims discussed by the court 
recited an arbitration module, arbitration system, and arbitration database.223  This 
                                                          
211 No. 2006-1286, 2009 WL 162408 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 26, 2009). 
212 558 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
213 581 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
214 Classen, 2008 WL 5273107, at *1. 
215 Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen Idec, No. WDQ-04-2607, 2006 WL 6161856, at *1 
(D. Md. Aug. 16, 2006). 
216 Id. at *5. 
217 Id. 
218 In re Comiskey, 499 F. 3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
219 Order on Petition for Rehearing En Banc, In re Comiskey, No. 2006-1286, 2009 U.S. App. 
Lexis 400, at *1–2 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 13, 2009). 
220 In re Comiskey, No. 2006-1286, 2009 WL 162408, at *11 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 26, 2009). 
221 Id. at *10. 
222 Id.  The court noted that the applicant had conceded that these claims neither required a machine 
nor described a process of manufacture or process to alter the composition of matter, closely tracking 
the machine-or-transformation test.  Id. 
223 Id. 
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second group of claims was limited “wherein access to the mandatory arbitration is 
established through the Internet, intranet, World Wide Web, software applications, 
telephone, television, cable, video [or radio], magnetic, electronic communication, 
or other communications means.”224  Finding that this second group of claims 
could, under the broadest reasonable interpretation, require the use of a machine, 
the Federal Circuit remanded to the PTO to consider whether the second group of 
claims recited statutory subject matter under § 101.225 
In In re Ferguson, the Federal Circuit held claims reciting a method relating 
to a collective marketing regimen for computer software companies patent-
ineligible.226  While the method claims were tied to a “marketing force,” the court 
concluded that the claims still failed the machine prong of the machine-or-
transformation test because no “concrete thing, consisting of parts, or of certain 
devices and combination of devices” existed.227  Those claims, the court found, 
also failed the transformation prong because they merely organized business or 
legal relationships.228  Other “paradigm claims” were similarly held patent-
ineligible for failure to fit within any one of the four § 101 categories.229  Circuit 
Judge Newman filed a concurring opinion stating that the majority improperly 
expanded upon Bilski by defining abstract ideas as anything that does not meet the 
machine-or-transformation test.230 
Providing contrast to Classen, the Federal Circuit unanimously reversed an 
invalidation of biotechnology patents in Prometheus Laboratories, Inc. v. Mayo 
Collaborative Services.231  The two patents at issue concerned two different 
autoimmune disease drugs to be used within similar methods of calculating 
dosages for optimal therapeutic efficacy.232  While the lower court found these 
patents invalid for claiming “natural correlations and data-gathering steps,” the 
Federal Circuit explained that “methods of treatment . . . are always transformative 
when a defined group of drugs is administered to the body to ameliorate the effects 
of an undesired condition.”233  Regardless of whether the above explanation was 
meant as a per se rule under the transformation prong, the Federal Circuit advanced 
the following grounds for finding patent-eligibility: (1) the patents recited 
transformative claims because the diagnostic processes required both the 
transformation of drugs into metabolites within the human body and the 
transformation of human tissue samples into non-human samples;234 (2) the 
                                                          
224 Id. 
225 Id. at *11. 
226 558 F.3d 1359, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
227 Id. at 1363–64 (quoting In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2007)). 
228 Id. at 1364. 
229 Id. at 1365–66. 
230 Id. at 1366–68 (Newman, J., concurring). 
231 Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 581 F.3d 1336, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2009).  It 
should be remembered that while viewing Prometheus alongside Classen may provide contrast of 
certain concepts, Classen remains a non-precedential opinion.  See supra note 214 and accompanying 
text. 
232 Prometheus Labs., 581 F.3d at 1339–40. 
233 Id. at 1346. 
234 Id. at 1345–47. 
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patents’ data gathering steps were neither “mere data-gathering” steps nor 
“insignificant extra-solution activity” because those steps were central to the 
purpose of medical diagnosis;235 and (3) the patents’ final mental step of producing 
a particular medical warning was innocuous because “[a] subsequent mental step 
does not, by itself, negate the transformative nature of prior steps.”236 
2.  Petition for Writ of Certiorari 
On January 28, 2009, a petition for certiorari was filed on behalf of 
petitioners Bernard L. Bilski and Rand A. Warsaw.237  The first question presented 
to the Court reads: 
Whether the Federal Circuit erred by holding that a “process” must be tied to a 
particular machine or apparatus, or transform a particular article into a different 
state or thing (“machine-or-transformation” test), to be eligible for patenting under 
§ 101, despite this Court’s precedent declining to limit the broad statutory grant of 
patent eligibility for “any” new and useful process beyond excluding patents for 
“laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas.”238 
The second question reads: “Whether the Federal Circuit’s ‘machine-or-
transformation’ test for patent eligibility, which effectively forecloses meaningful 
patent protection to many business methods, contradicts the clear Congressional 
intent that patents protect ‘method[s] of doing or conducting business.’”239  
Certiorari was granted on June 1, 2009.240 
3.  Supreme Court Briefs 
a.  Brief for Petitioners 
The Brief for Petitioners can be reasonably broken down into four main 
arguments.241  Within the first main argument, petitioners asserted that the 
machine-or-transformation test conflicts with statutory and case authority 
establishing that the scope of § 101 is broad.242  The second main argument 
proposed that the Patent Act recognizes the patent-eligibility of business methods 
within 35 U.S.C. § 273.243  Third, petitioners argued that the Court should 
recognize a practical application test for patents involving fundamental 
principles.244  Lastly, petitioners’ fourth argument alleged that Bilski’s claims at 
                                                          
235 Id. at 1343, 1347–48. 
236 Id. at 1348–50. 
237 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Bilski v. Doll, No. 08-964, 2009 WL 226501 (U.S. filed Jan. 28, 
2009). 
238 Id. at *i. 
239 Id. 
240 Bilski v. Doll, 129 S. Ct. 2735 (2009). 
241 See Brief for Petitioners at iii–vi, Bilski v. Doll, No. 08-964, 2009 WL 2372921 (U.S. filed July 
30, 2009). 
242 See id. 
243 See id. 
244 See id. 
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issue are patent-eligible when analyzed under the averred proper framework for § 
101 process inventions.245  
While partly enabling the ultimate conclusion of patent-eligibility, 
petitioners’ first main argument that § 101 is more broad in scope than the 
machine-or-transformation test permits is also critical for understanding how the 
legal system should promote the policies underlying the Patent Act.246  Petitioners 
began by identifying statutory support in the expansive words of § 101 that “any 
new and useful process” is patent-eligible247 in order to foster human 
innovations.248  Juxtaposing the words of the statute with steadfast Supreme Court 
support for an expansive reading of the statute249 enabled petitioners to argue that 
the Federal Circuit has not only flouted two express denials of the machine-or-
transformation test,250 but has also intruded into the ambit of the legislature.251  
Corollary to the above, petitioners noted that the rigid and limiting qualities of the 
machine-or-transformation test disrupt inventors’ settled expectations of what is 
patent-eligible252 and disrupt how other sections of the Patent Act were meant to 
operate within the statutory scheme.253  
                                                          
245 See id. 
246 See id. at 18–28, 37–42. 
247 Brief for Petitioners, supra note 241, at 18–19, 26–28 (emphasis added) (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 
101).  “[T]he Court has also been informed by congressional intent that statutory subject matter 
‘include[s] anything under the sun that is made by man.’”  Id. at 19 (quoting S. Rep. No. 82-1979, at 5 
(1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394, 2399; H.R. Rep. No. 82-1923, at 6 (1952)). 
248 Id. at 26–28 (quoting Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 316 (1980) (“Congress employed 
broad general language in drafting § 101 precisely because . . . inventions are often unforeseeable.”)). 
249 Id. at 19–20 (citing J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 130 
(2001) (“As this Court recognized over 20 years ago in Chakrabarty, the language of § 101 is extremely 
broad.”); Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 308 (“Congress plainly contemplated that the patent laws would be 
given wide scope.”)). 
250 Id. at 20–21 (quoting Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71 (1971): 
It is argued that a process patent must either be tied to a particular machine or 
apparatus or must operate to change articles or materials to a ‘different state or 
thing.’  We do not hold that no process patent could ever qualify if it did not meet 
the requirements of our prior precedents.; 
Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 588 n.9 (1978) 
The statutory definition of ‘process’ is broad.  An argument can be made, 
however, that this Court has only recognized a process as within the statutory 
definition when it either was tied to a particular apparatus or operated to change 
materials to a ‘different state or thing.’  As in Benson, we assume that a valid 
process patent may issue even if it does not meet one of these qualifications of 
our earlier precedents. (citations omitted)). 
251 Id. at 37–42 (quoting Expanded Metal Co. v. Bradford, 214 U.S. 366, 382 (1909) (“[T]he statute 
. . . secures to inventors the right of protection; and it is not the province of the courts to so limit the 
statute as to deprive meritorious inventors of its benefits.”); Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 318 (“Congress is 
free to amend § 101 . . . [b]ut, until Congress takes such action, this Court must construe the language 
of § 101 as it is.”)). 
252 Id. at 39–40 (quoting Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 739 
(2002) (“Fundamental alterations in these rules risk destroying the legitimate expectations of inventors 
in their property.”)). 
253 Brief for Petitioners, supra note 241, at 40–42 (arguing that certain criticisms of business 
method patents illustrate problems applying rules of novelty, obviousness, and specification rather than 
§ 101) (citing 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–103, 112).  For example, petitioners note prior disconcertion from the 
Court that patents for business methods could be overly vague, e.g., eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 
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Moreover, petitioners pointed out that not only is § 101 broad, but also that 
business methods are expressly recognized in § 273.254  Within § 273, Congress 
crafted a defense to actions alleging the infringement of patents for methods where 
“method” is defined as a “method of doing or conducting business.”255  Therefore, 
petitioners argued that because the Federal Circuit’s machine-or-transformation 
test has been interpreted as a threat to existing business method patents,256 then § 
273 would be improperly rendered superfluous as a defense without any 
concomitant threat257 and thereby inharmonious relative to § 101258 if the machine-
or-transformation test is allowed to stand.259 
Instead of the machine-or-transformation test, petitioners posited that the 
proper § 101 test annunciated by the Court must be the practical application test.260  
The practical application test states that although abstract ideas, laws of nature, and 
natural phenomena are not within the limits of § 101, a practical application of 
those principles would be.261  This position is supported with Supreme Court 
precedent dating back some 150 years,262 and continued into the present.263  
                                                          
547 U.S. 388, 397 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring), and argue that this problem should not be remedied 
with the broad-scoped § 101, but is best dealt with under the statutory provisions regarding patent 
specifications, which require “a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of 
making and using it, in . . . full, clear, concise, and exact terms,” under 35 U.S.C. § 112. 
254 Brief for Petitioners, supra note 241, at 29–37. 
255 Id. at 29 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 273). 
256 Id. at 33–34 (quoting CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 620 F. Supp. 2d 1068, 1081 
& n.16 (N.D. Cal. 2009) 
Although the majority declined [to] say so explicitly, Bilski’s holding suggests a 
perilous future for most business method patents. . . . The closing bell may be 
ringing for business method patents, and their patentees may find they have 
become . . . [just like] shareholder[s] left holding shares of worthless stocks.) 
257 Id. at 34 (“Under the mandatory application of the machine-or-transformation test, § 273 would 
provide a meaningless defense to the infringement of a class of patents that cannot exist.”). 
258 Id. at 29 (quoting FTC v. Mandel Bros., Inc., 359 U.S. 385, 389 (1959) (“[I]f possible, all parts 
[of a statute should fit] into a[] harmonious whole.”); Davis v. Mich. Dept. of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 
809 (1989) (“It is a fundamental canon of statutory construction that the words of a statute must be read 
in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme.”)).  Further, petitioners 
analogized harmonizing §§ 101 and 273 with how the Court had previously rationalized the patent-
eligibility of plant patents under § 101 by reference to 35 U.S.C. § 119.  Id. at 34–37 (citing J.E.M. Ag 
Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124 (2001)). 
259 Id. at 34 (“That cannot be what Congress intended, and the Federal Circuit’s failure to address 
this conflict between its decision and the clear legislative intent expressed through the adoption of § 273 
warrants reversal.”). 
260 Brief for Petitioners, supra note 241, at 42–52. 
261 Id. at 42. 
262 Id. at 43–46 (quoting O’Reilley v. Morse, 15 How. (56 U.S.) 62, 119 (1854) 
Whoever discovers that a certain useful result will be produced, in any art, 
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, by the use of certain means, is 
entitled to a patent for it. . . . It makes no difference . . . whether the effect is 
produced by chemical agency or combination; or by the application of 
discoveries or principles in natural philosophy known or unknown before his 
invention; or by machinery acting altogether upon mechanical principles.) 
263 Id. (citing Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U.S. 707 (1880); The Telephone Cases, 126 U.S. 1 (1888); 
New Process Fermentation Co. v. Maus, 122 U.S. 413 (1887); Mackay Radio & Tel. Co. v. Radio Corp. 
of Am., 306 U.S. 86 (1939); Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127 (1948); Diamond 
v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980); Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981)).  Petitioners also 
asserted that the Federal Circuit has followed the practical application standard.  Id. at 53 (citing In re 
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Moreover, petitioners differentiated the evolution of the American patent system 
rather than paralleling it with English patent law, specifying that the English 
system began as a means to promote manufacturing industry while the American 
patent system markedly broke from that practice by allowing patents for a wide 
variety of human discoveries.264 
Under the practical application test, petitioners alleged the Bilski patent to be 
patent-eligible under § 101.265  First, petitioners asserted that all the patent claims 
fall within the § 101 category of processes because they describe a method for 
hedging financial risk associated with commodities transactions.266  Petitioners 
then argued that the process of hedging is not an impermissible abstract idea 
because, rather than merely attempting to patent the abstract business concept of 
hedging, the claimed method is particularized with regard to the parties involved in 
the commodities trading and with regard to the weather-oriented aspect of the 
trading.267  Finally, the patent arguably satisfied § 101 strictures because the 
described mathematical formula itself was not claimed, but the formula was put to 
practical application to determine a certain price within the useful process of 
hedging financial risk through weather-related commodities trading.268 
b.  Brief for the Respondent 
The Brief for the Respondent is broken into three main arguments.269  
Respondent began by asserting that only industrial and technological processes, 
not methods of organizing human activity, fall within the protection § 101 
offers.270  Next, the respondent argued that the scope of § 101 is not expanded by § 
273.271  Hinged upon the preceding arguments, respondent lastly noted that the 
Federal Circuit correctly denied statutory eligibility for the Bilski patent under § 
101.272 
While respondent’s first main argument presented a mode of § 101 analysis 
parallel to that found in the Federal Circuit’s en banc opinion, respondent treaded 
further in countering a variety of petitioners’ arguments.273  In order to support 
congressional intent that § 101 is broad without encompassing methods of 
organizing human activity, respondent pointed to the plain statutory text and 
argued with support from Supreme Court precedent,274 support from historical 
                                                          
Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc); State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, 
Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998); AT&T Corp. v. Excel Commc’ns, Inc., 172 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 
1999)). 
264 Id. at 47–52. 
265 Id. at 52–59. 
266 Brief for Petitioners, supra note 241, at 55–56. 
267 Id. at 57–58. 
268 Id. at 58–59. 
269 Brief for the Respondent at III–IV, Bilski v. Kappos, No. 08-964, 2009 WL 3070864 (U.S. filed 
Sept. 25, 2009). 
270 Id. at 11–46. 
271 Id. at 46–51. 
272 Id. at 51–55. 
273 See id. at 11–46. 
274 Id. at 11–15 (citing Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 483 (1974); Lab. Corp. of 
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definition,275 and support from English patent law.276  Generally countering 
petitioners’ arguments, respondent presented the following: (1) that the 
congressional scope of “anything under the sun that is made by man” only includes 
machines and manufactures;277 (2) that “[t]he machine-or-transformation test 
accommodates evolving technology” rather than stilling modern advancements;278 
and (3) that the § 101 rubric advanced by petitioners cannot be proper.279 
Regarding petitioners’ § 273 argument, the respondent characterized 
petitioners’ analysis as improper, conceding that while § 273 prevents actions for 
infringement of business methods, that provision does not protect methods for 
organizing human activity.280  Respondent asserted that § 273 protects against 
business method infringement suits relating to business methods arising out of any 
of the four subject matter categories within § 101.281  Moreover, respondent 
contended that petitioners’ analogy to a similar plant patent-eligibility issue was 
misplaced because the PTO has historically sought judicial approval regarding how 
to treat process patents unlike the inferred congressional approval for the validity 
of plant patents.282 
Before calling for affirmation of the Federal Circuit’s decision, respondent 
analyzed the facts surrounding the Bilski patent under the machine-or-
transformation test in similar fashion as the Federal Circuit had.283  Respondent 
emphasized that the addition of a computer used to perform the mathematical 
calculations involved in the patent claims would “not [be] central to the purpose of 
the method invented by the applicant” and therefore patent-ineligible as 
“insignificant extra-solution activity.”284  As an additional ground for ruling the 
Bilski claims patent-ineligible, respondent proposed the claims would “‘pre-empt 
any application of the fundamental concept of hedging and mathematical 
calculations inherent in hedging consumption’ risk” for lack of meaningful claim 
                                                          
Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 127 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting from dismissal 
of a writ of certiorari)). 
275 Brief for the Respondent, supra note 269, at 16–19 (citing 1 NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN 
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1828)). 
276 Id. at 19–25 (arguing that the American patent system elaborates upon, rather than breaks away 
from, the historical English practice issuing patents primarily for technological or industrial processes).  
However, respondent conceded that there were some English patents on methods of organizing human 
activity.  Id. at 20 n.5. 
277 Id. at 25–36.  Specifically, respondent noted the congressional statement that “anything under 
the sun that is made by man” was tempered by the subsequent language reading, “is not necessarily 
patentable under [§ 101] unless the conditions of the title are fulfilled.”  Id. at 28.  Respondent 
interpreted one condition of the title through “the ‘commonsense’ cannon . . . [that] ‘a word is given 
more precise content by the neighboring words with which it is associated.’”  Id. at 26.  This 
interpretaion enabled respondent to argue that the other § 101 categories of machine, manufacture, and 
compositions of matter restricted the scope of § 101 processes to those of an industrial or technological 
vintage.  Id. at 26–27. 
278 Id. at 36–44. 
279 Id. at 44–46. 
280 Id. at 46–49. 
281 Brief for the Respondent, supra note 269, at 49. 
282 Id. at 49–50; see supra note 258. 
283  Brief for the Respondent, supra note 269, at 51–55. 
284 Id. at 52–53. 
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delineation – an intolerable attempt to patent an abstract idea.285 
c.  Reply Brief for Petitioners 
The Reply Brief for Petitioners elaborated upon four arguments that had 
developed during the course of litigation.  Petitioners’ maintained that upholding 
the technology limitation on process patents through the machine-or-
transformation test would be improper.286  Second, petitioners confronted the 
respondent’s arguments that § 273 broadened the scope of § 101 and that the 
machine-or-transformation test embodied the scope of § 101.287  The practical 
application test, alongside other Patent Act limitations, was supported within the 
third argument.288  Finally, petitioners asserted pitfalls within the machine-or-
transformation framework as illustrated by respondent’s analysis of petitioners’ 
arguments.289 
B.  Broader Impact 
1.  Effect on Business Methods, Computer Programs, and 
Biotechnology 
Bilski’s relationship with business method patents is perhaps most 
obvious,290 yet the total effect the Federal Circuit decision will have is fairly 
elusive.291  Ambiguity stems from the court’s mandate that business method 
patents not be categorically excluded under § 101,292 coupled with the declination 
to elaborate on the contours of the machine-or-transformation test beyond what the 
facts required.293  For example, a patent applicant claiming a business method has 
very little guidance on whether the business method is sufficiently tied to a 
particular machine, whether any physical object qualifies as a particular 
machine,294 or whether the involvement of the machine is “insignificant post-
                                                          
285 Id. at 53–54. 
286 Id. at 3–20. 
287 Id. at 20–24. 
288 Id. at 24–27. 
289  Brief for the Respondent, supra note 269, at 27–28. 
290 In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 949 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (identifying the business method at issue, 
namely “[a] method for managing the consumption risk costs of a commodity sold by a commodity 
provider at a fixed price”). 
291 See Scott Bain, Patently Undecided: The Bilski Case, 26 INFO. TODAY 2 (2009) (“[T]he court’s 
lengthy attempt to enunciate the new, proper standard, along with exceptions, leaves much to be argued 
in future cases.  Indeed, it seems that the real winners in the Bilski decision are the patent lawyers who 
will battle over the further contours of the law and not the investors in software and business ventures 
who were seeking more certainty.”). 
292 Bilski, 545 F.3d at 960 (citing State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 
at 1375–76)). 
293 Id. at 962 (“We leave to future cases the elaboration of the precise contours of machine 
implementation[.]”). 
294 Id. (“We leave to future cases . . . the answers to particular questions, such as whether or when 
recitation of a computer suffices to tie a process claim to a particular machine.”).  In In re Ferguson, the 
Federal Circuit defined “machine” as a “concrete thing, consisting of parts, or of certain devices and 
combination of devices.”  See supra note 227 and accompanying text.  However, the Federal Circuit did 
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solution” activity.295 
Similarly vague is the effect Bilski will have on computer program 
processes.296  Again, ambiguity stems from the Federal Circuit’s refusal to 
elaborate on the contours of the machine-or-transformation test beyond what the 
facts required.297  To exemplify, a patent applicant claiming a process carried out 
by a particular computer program on a particular computer would have little 
guidance upon whether the computer would suffice the machine branch of the § 
101 inquiry,298 or whether the computer would create a mere field-of-use 
limitation.299  This applicant would also have little guidance on whether the 
particular computer program must also be embodied on a specific medium.300 
Bilski’s § 101 precedent further casts a shadow of ambiguity over the field of 
biotechnology.301  For instance, a patent applicant claiming a method of collecting 
data about a person’s organs and transforming the “raw data” into a visual 
representation of numbers thereafter analyzed to detect abnormalities requiring 
medical attention is left in the dark regarding patent-eligibility.302  To the extent 
innovative medical diagnostic methods can be characterized as “an inquiry of the 
extent of the proposed correlation between vaccines and chronic disorders,” it 
appears that the Federal Circuit would find such methods patent-ineligible as 
natural phenomena.303  However, diagnostic processes are probably patent-eligible 
as long as those methods require the transformative administration of drugs to a 
human body.304 
2.  Effect on Trade Secret Consideration 
The term “trade secret” has been defined as follows: 
A formula, process, device, or other business information that is kept confidential 
to maintain an advantage over competitors; information—including a formula, 
                                                          
not explain how that definition excludes a human brain from being a “concrete thing” in light of the 
statement that “a claimed process wherein all of the process steps may be performed entirely in the 
human mind is obviously not tied to any machine.”  Bilski, 545 F.3d at 961 n.26. 
295 Bilski, 545 F.3d at 1015 (Rader, J., dissenting) (“[T]his opinion propagates unanswerable 
questions: . . . . What constitutes [insignificant] ‘extra-solution activity’?”). 
296 See Bain, supra note 291; Bilski, 545 F.3d at 998 (Mayer, J., dissenting) (stating the majority 
failed to elucidate one of the “thorniest issues in the patent [eligibility] thicket. . . . [T]he extent to 
which computer software . . . constitute[s] statutory subject matter.”). 
297  Bilski, 545 F.3d at 962 (“We leave to future cases the elaboration of the precise contours of 
machine implementation . . . .”). 
298 See supra notes 223–25 and accompanying text. 
299 See Ex parte Halligan, No. 2008-1588, 2008 WL 4998541, at *1–2, *13–14 (B.P.A.I. Nov. 24, 
2008); Ex parte Gutta, No. 2008-3000, 2009 WL 112393, at *1–3 (B.P.A.I. Jan. 15, 2009). 
300 See Ex parte Noguchi, No. 2008-1231, 2008 WL 4968270, at *5–7 (B.P.A.I. Nov. 20, 2008); Ex 
parte Cornea-Hasegan, No. 2008-4742, 2009 WL 86725, at *1, *6 (B.P.A.I. Jan. 13, 2009). 
301 See, e.g., Christopher M. Holman, Applying Bilski to Biotechnology and the Life Sciences, 
PATENTLY-O, Nov. 4, 2008, http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2008/11/applying-bilski.html. 
302 See Bilski, 545 F.3d at 1015 (Rader, J., dissenting) (“[T]his opinion propagates unanswerable 
questions: . . . . When is a ‘representative’ of a physical object sufficiently linked to that object to 
satisfy the transformation test?”). 
303 See supra notes 214–17 and accompanying text. 
304 See supra notes 231–36 and accompanying text. 
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pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique, or process—that (1) 
derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally 
known or readily ascertainable by others who can obtain economic value from its 
disclosure or use, and (2) is the subject of reasonable efforts, under the 
circumstances, to maintain its secrecy.305 
Augmenting this definition, trade secrets can be understood as relatives of 
patents.306  However, trade secrets are broader in scope because protection of the 
asset is governed only by the ability of the owner to maintain secrecy whereas 
patent protection is defined relatively narrowly by the Patent Act.307  Accordingly, 
inventors may choose to protect their processes or methods through the use of 
trade secrets rather than patents.  Regarding business methods, computer programs 
and biotechnology, inventors expecting Bilski to foreclose their ability to obtain 
patents will protect their inventions with trade secrets so long as the specific 
inventions can practically be kept secret. 
3.  Effect on Patent Examination 
Patent examiners who evaluate patent applications for, among other things, 
patent-eligibility under § 101 must meet various requirements set by the PTO.308  
Persons applying to become patent examiners “bear the burden of showing the 
requisite scientific and technical training.”309  Applicants cannot meet this burden 
by demonstrating they have taken “courses in management, business 
administration and operations research; courses on how to use computer software; 
courses directed to data management and management information systems.”310  
However, Bilski specifically declined to categorically exclude business method 
patents from protection under § 101.311  It is reasonable to assume that inventors 
will submit patent applications dealing with business concepts for examination by 
examiners who will be unable to properly evaluate the patent application.  If the 
issuance of higher quality patents is desired,312 the PTO must ensure that patent 
examiners are skilled in the areas related to § 101 subject matter, including 
business. 
4.  Effect on Deference to the Federal Circuit 
The Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction over patent appeals.313  This 
                                                          
305 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004) (emphasis added). 
306 MARK A. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW § 8.18, at 516 (1994). 
307 See id. 
308 See General Requirements Bulletin for Admission to the Examination for Registration to 
Practice in Patent Cases Before the United States Patent and Trademark Office (2008), 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/dcom/olia/oed/grb.pdf. 
309 Id. at 4. 
310 Id. at 7. 
311 In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 960 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
312 PATRICK LEAHY, THE PATENT REFORM ACT OF 2007, S. REP. NO. 110-259, at 3 (2008), 
available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110_cong_reports&docid=f: 
sr259.pdf. 
313 28 U.S.C. §§ 1292, 1295 (2000). 
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authority enables the Federal Circuit to be a specialized court that adeptly handles, 
among other matters, highly complex patent cases that might otherwise cause 
undue conflict among the various United States Courts of Appeals.314  Resultantly, 
a circuit split that might influence the Supreme Court’s decision to review a case 
regarding a patent matter cannot occur.  Abrogating three of its own and three of 
its predecessor courts’ decisions en banc in Bilski and drawing three dissenting 
opinions, the Federal Circuit created a situation where review from the Court 
became necessary to resolve the apparent internal conflict at the Federal Circuit.315  
Deference to the Federal Circuit should be given in order to allow the resolution of 
increasingly complex matters, but certainly not to allow the court to “usurp[] the 
legislative role.”316  
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Even if the machine-or-transformation test eventually achieved laudable 
results such as enhancing patent quality, the test leaves a multitude of open-ended 
questions that belie an entirely reasonable interpretation of the Patent Act, Federal 
Circuit case law, and Supreme Court precedent.317  Moreover, such open-ended 
questions inject uncertainty into a patent system that is already experiencing 
turbulence.318  Without explaining the machine prong and leaving the 
transformation prong fairly unrefined,319 it is not at all clear why the majority held 
that the machine-or-transformation test was a better means of rejecting the claims 
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